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ABSTRACT 
This article aims to discuss Islamic movements that have the potential to carry out 
radical ideology, global network of jihad and terrorism in the name of religion. Using 
Michael foucault's theory of power, with a descriptive-analytical analysis, this article wants 
to examine the level of political accommodation of the government since the Dutch East 
Indies, Japanese occupation, old order, new order and post-reformation as Azyumardi Azra's 
thesis which states that the government applies soft power or accommodative politics in 
dealing with modernist groups that tend to become radicalized. The result was; 1. The old 
order, which is known to be authoritarian and repressive, turns out to be the most 
accommodating and even fertile ground for the development of radicalism. 2. Modernist 
islamic groups are divided into two, one that leads to radicalism and the other to moderate. 
3. Traditional islamic groups consistently become moderate groups. 
Keywords: Radicalism, Accommodative Politics, the Islamic Movement, State 
INTRODUCTION 
In its history, religion has never been a tool of political resistance except for several 
narratives such as the effect of arbitration between Mu'awwiyah and Ali's followers. This 
radical movement was successfully crushed through political stabilization by the Ummayyah 
dynasty. In the expansion process, the preference that develops is political narrative, not 
religion. Radicalism in Islam only emerged after Islam came into contact with Western 
education. The Muslims became aware that they were being colonized and needed 
independence (Ali, 1995). The consistent narrative of fundamentalism is that everything that 
comes from the West has the potential to become a threat, so Muslims must take firm and 
tough action. 
Azyumardi Azra says that the State applies a soft and accommodating political system 
to modern Islamic movements in Indonesia. By continuing to prioritize clear boundaries in 
thinking and acting for these movements. Therefore, even though there are actually many 
individuals and modern religious movements in Indonesia that are radical, the State faces 
them with a gentle, appreciative and accommodating approach (Azra, 2007). 
Power is not always synonymous with hegemony as described by Antonio Gramsci 
(Bates, 1975). Power has many approaches in its implementation. The state's handling of 
Islamic movements takes various forms, such as inclusion, subordination, patron-client 
relations, and agent-structure as thought by Giddens, Bourdieu and Archer. According to 
Michael Foucault, power is not a kind of ownership system, it is not repressive (Foucault, 
1982). According to him, power can apply in various ways. Power is adjusted according to 
various disciplinary strategies so that normality occurs (Green, 2010).  
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In realizing this normality, the powerful Government in the period of the Dutch East 
Indies, Japanese Occupation, Old Order, New Order and Post-Reformation, Indonesia 
implemented normalization in the form of soft power against the powerless Islamic 
movement. This article aims to measure the degree (gradation) of the soft-power application 
of the government in those periods. The focus of its case in each period was: First, how the 
Dutch East Indies handled the Padri troops and the establishment of many modern Islamic 
movements. Second, how the Japanese Occupation organized the Islamic movement. Third, 
how did the Old Order deal with the potential for fundamentalism by Masjumi in the 
Constituent Assembly and their attitude towards modernist Muslim intelligence? Fourth, how 
the New Order handled the modernists of former Masjumi members and Fifth, how the 
potential for radicalism was overcome in the Post Reformation. The indicator is the 




Apart from bringing up the idea of independence, radicalism has also made Muslims 
aware that Islam as their religion and belief has been left backward compared to the advances 
that have been made by the West. This realization led Muslim intellectuals to take action in 
different ways. Some responded to the decline of Islam with reformist movements, some with 
conservatives and some with violent means. The group that chooses tough methods is known 
as the radical group (Muzakki, 2014). 
Radicalism is a notion that wants the changes by violence or extremes. They want the 
changes in a short time. This method can conflict with the on going social system. Radicalism 
is synonymous with terrorism because they make changes by spreading terror to anyone who 
is considered to be a nuisance and hinders the changes they want. One of the important 
features of radicalism is that it considers people whose views differ from them as guilty. 
Without much consideration, they immediately paralyze people who disagree with them in a 
harsh and cruel way (Ramakrishna, 2009). 
Anzar Abdullah said that even though it is a term made by the West to designate 
Islam as its subject, radical actions in Islam have existed for a long time. Khawarij is a radical 
school because it fulfills radical criteria. They claim beliefs that are different from theirs are 
heretical. They force the other side to follow what they believe. Khawarij also committed 
violence to achieve his wishes (Nasution, 2018; Sukring, 2016). Radicalism has the potential 
to commit terrorism. Adherents of this view generally interpret authoritative texts in a very 
literalistic manner. They suspect various forms of renewal. They demanded that the Muslims 
apply ideas that are understood literally from authoritative texts. According to them, Islam 
which has been mixed with various forms of modernity is heretical. Islam must be positioned 
in a very pure position (Emmanuel Sivan). 
Radical ideology has been practiced by the Khawarij group. They claimed that Ali 
and Muawwiyah had become kafir because they did not observe Allah's law. A literalistic and 
rigid mind set in understanding texts is a characteristic of Khawarij (Nasution, 2018). This 
characteristic can be a basic barometer to say someone or a group is a radicalist. Radicalism 
in modern times occurs as a reaction against Western colonialism. They want to reject 
Western principles which are considered literalistically as a challenge to Islam (Azra, 1999). 
The radical ideology in religion should not be a big problem in Indonesia (Miswari, 
2018). The reason is that this radicalism emerged from a literalistic perspective which is 
unique to the Arabian (Schoun, 1995). The people of the archipelago have historically had a 
tradition of flexible understanding of religion. Islam in Indonesia can "negotiate" well with 
the social context of the archipelago which is full of cultural uniqueness and beauty. In 
Indonesia, Islam is able to see the essence of culture and the essence of religion as a whole, 
which is different only in the approach and actuality of implementation (Nasution & Miswari, 
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2017). In short, the character of Indonesian is different from Arabian, which is the birth place 
and development of radical religious methods (Arifin Mansurnoor, 1992; Muzakki, 2014). 
Indonesian society realizes that culture is a solution to solve life's problems. Cultural 
practices in Indonesia have never been seen as inconsistent with religious principles and 
practices (Mansurnoor, 2018). Religion and culture can live in harmony in Indonesia. The 
public is aware that religion is the same as culture; it presents to provide direction, guidance 
and life spirit. The religion and culture are seen as providing convenience and beauty in life 
(Uhi, 2016).  
The birth of Pancasila (The Five Principles) as the basis of the state shows the breadth 
and depth of life perspective of the Indonesian people (Latif, 2015). The Pancasila discusses 
the basic foundation of humanity. This foundation is the same as the basic principles of 
Islam. In its deepest reflection, the Indonesian people realize that God is a Single Reality, 
justice is the foundation of humanity, unity and united are realized realities, wisdom is the 
benchmarks of social integration, and social justice is a balance to the life of the nation and 
the state of these principles as well is the essence of religion (Latif, 2018). 
During the period from the Dutch East Indies to the Post-Reformation, Indonesia 
adopted different approaches in dealing with society. The approach taken adapts to the 
situation and needs. The goal remains for social stability. Islamic movements, especially 
radical Islamic movements, also received different treatment in each period of government 
(Kuntowijoyo, 2004). Each period has a different way of dealing with the actions of the 
Islamic movement. In general, it can be said that all of these periods applied accommodative 
politics in dealing with Islamic movements (Azra, 2007). But each period, as powerful state, 
it has a different level of accommodation in each period in dealing with the Islamic 
movement as powerless (Foucault, 1982). 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Dutch Indies Handling Padri and the Development of Modernism 
 
In general, modernism in Indonesia and the Islamic world was a reaction against 
colonialism launched by Europe against Eastern countries (Ali, 1995). Awareness of 
oppression and occupation made the Muslim ummah arise from the education introduced by 
the West. So the actors of Islamic modernization are those who have had contact with 
Western education (Azra, 2007).  
Modernization occured in various ways ranging from conservative as practiced by 
Abdul Wahab in Saudi, integralization carried out by Muhammad Abduh (Azra, 2014b), 
Revitalization as carried out by Rasyid Ridha, Reconstruction as carried out by Sir 
Muhammad Iqbal and Cellularization as carried out by Syed Amir Ali. All of these 
movement models indirectly influenced the modernization models in Indonesia. 
 The first modern movement in Indonesia was recorded during the Dutch East Indies 
Government in Minangkabau which was carried out by the Padri movement. This movement 
was originally motivated by jealousy from conservative-Islamist parties who saw the triumph 
of traditional leaders as leaders of the country. This triumph occurred due to Minang Country 
which was able to produce a lot of agricultural and mining products. The increase in 
economic activity was also triggered by changes in the global economic constellation. The 
collapse of Napoleon allowed Britain and the Netherlands to conduct trade transactions more 
aggressively (Caroll Kersten, 2017). 
In this regard, Minangkabau revivalist muslim scholars who had completed their 
education under the influence of Wahhabism in the Hijaz such as Haji Miskin, Haji Piobang 
and Haji Sumanik criticized the policies of traditional leaders who allowed cultural practices 
that they considered to be acts of heresy, khurafat and superstition. These muslim scholars 
considered that culture is syirik (Azra, 2004). 
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Not heeding the warnings, the Wahhabi muslim scholars gathered followers and 
attacked the Pagaruyung Kingdom. The continuous war made the Netherlands a disadvantage 
due to economic chaos. The Netherlands came here due to the invitation of traditional elders. 
The Netherlands has repeatedly rejected to have a war. They came only to secure their trade. 
But the Padri troops did not heed it until the war continued for decades (Hadler, 2008; Yetti, 
2008). The Padri War turned into a war against colonialism which the Indonesian government 
later considered a war against the Dutch colonialists until the continuation of the Padri War, 
Tuanku Imam Bonjol was appointed a National Hero (Fenton, 2015). The Dutch East Indies, 
which succeeded in conquering the Padri Army, later built a monument to the Padri War and 
this led to the romance of the Minang people that they had persistently fought against the 
Dutch colonialists.  
Appreciation for the Padri troops and the ease with which modern Islamic 
organizations were born under the Dutch East Indies government made the accommodative 
political value of this government high. The Netherlands only needs the approval of 
traditional leaders to establish an Islamic organization. Because many Islamic organizations 
were trained by priyanyi such as Sarekat Islam (SI) which was founded by H.O.S. 
Tjokroaminoto and Raden Mas Tirtoadhisuryo. This organization can be said to be the first 
modern Islamic organization on a national scale (Noer, 1996). The motive for the 
establishment of Sarekat Islam (SI) was for economic benefit. Later on the SI also turned into 
a political organization. The presence of SI has made the spirit of nationalism even higher. 
The SI can be said to be the upstream for the various downstream branches of Islamic 
modernism. Radical, moderate, socialist, conservative Muslims all converge on the SI 
(Hongxuan, 2018). 
The experience of modern Minangkabau intelligence gave a lot of color to Islamic 
modernism in the Dutch East Indies. The presence of Agus Salim made the SI more stable 
from the infiltration of socialist groups. He made the SI more exclusive. The spirit of the SI 
became very similar to the Muhammadiyah founded by Ahmad Dahlan. Dahlan and Salim 
are both Hijaz alumni. Their perspective was the same, namely that they wanted to eliminate 
the cultural practices of the archipelago because they were considered heretical, khurafat and 
syirik (Qoyyim, 2015). 
Through the Muhammadiyah movement, Ahmad Dahlan, who was also a member of 
the SI, focused on anti-culture. The organization was engaged in health and education. In 
Aceh, Muhammadiyah was accepted by Uleebalangs (District leaders appointed by the Dutch 
East Indies) who wanted to show that they were accommodating to Islam, but the 
organization did not get a good place in (Muhammadiyah: Usut Kasus-Pembakaran Masjid 
Di Aceh, 2017). Muhammadiyah is still remembered as an organization that is more towards 
a fundamentalist attitude even though it has recently tried to accommodate Al-Ghazalian 
Sufism (Biyanto, 2017). 
It was the same as Agus Salim and Ahmad Dahlan, Ahmad Muhammad Surkati was 
also the Hijaz alumnus who founded Al-Irsyad. The organization also shared similarities with 
Muhammadiyah, namely removing local culture which was considered the practice of syirik. 
The aim of this organization is to apply Arabic culture and literalistic religious practices in 
the archipelago (Caroll Kersten, 2017).  
Apart from Al-Ershad, Persis was also established. Led by textile entrepreneurs, led 
by A. Hassan, Persis had a member of the smart and modern-minded youth from 
Minangkabau, namely Mohammad Natsir (Mat Diah & Cholil, 2018). Persis also carried the 
principle of resistance to local cultural practices that were considered heretical, khurafat and 
heretical. Persis had been heavily influenced by the thoughts of the Jamaat Islam movement 
led by Abu A'la Al-Maududi and Ikhwanul Muslim led by Hasan Al-Banna. This influence 
made Persis more aggressive in spreading his views. The provocative writings in the Pembela 
Islam newspaper made the Netherlands stop its publication which had been running for six 
years (Caroll Kersten, 2017). 
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The Dutch response to fundamental organizations such as Persis was so soft, it only 
banned the publication of the Islamic Defenders newspaper because its actions were very 
extreme by taking actions that endangered religious harmony, even Persis was able to publish 
other media newspapers namely Al-Lisan which was published until Japan deployed their 
troops (Suharto, 2011).  
These Islamic organizations were easy to establish without getting tight protection 
from the Dutch East Indies Government. The blessing of traditional leaders as local leaders 
who became partners of the Netherlands was sufficient for the Netherlands to prove that these 
organizations did not endanger the organizations initiated and supported by traditional leaders 
(Kamila, 2017).  
In Aceh, the first Islamic educational institution was founded by Teuku Raja 
Keumala. Furthermore, many local Islamic educational institutions were established as a 
response to modernism. Furthermore, the leaders of modern Islamic education institutions 
gathered to establish PUSA (the association of Muslim scholars throughout Aceh). The 
PUSA was established as a response to uleebalangs in various regions in Aceh who opened 
branches of modern Islamic organizations (Kamila, 2017). According to modernist muslim 
scholars, these organizations were not compatible with Acehnese culture. They offer the 
PUSA as an alternative. In order to receive the blessing of the Netherlands, Teuku Chik 
Peusangan stood at the forefront of the establishment of the organization. But then the PUSA 
became an organization that massacred Uleebalangs (Munhanif et al., 2016). 
But look at how the Indonesian government made Tuanku Imam Bonjol a national 
hero. Yet it is clear that he was the leader of the Padri Islamic radical movement. Likewise, 
the PUSA members had an honorable position because they succeeded in conquering the 
Uleebalang (Munhanif, 2016). The PUSA is the initiator of the joining of Aceh with the 
Indonesian Government. Without PUSA, maybe the Dutch troops entered Aceh during 
Military Aggression II and thwarted the integration of Indonesia and Aceh. Without PUSA, 
perhaps only Aceh would be left behind to become a Dutch colony while Indonesia gained 
independence. 
Just as Nahdatul Ulama (NU) claims to be a traditional representation of Islam and 
was established in response to the emergence of various modern Islamic organizations, the 
PUSA also claims to have been born from the same spirit. But actually the establishment of 
PUSA was not much different from the Padri and the SI Movement. The motive was socio-
economic. Meanwhile, the NU has similarities with Muhammadiyah and other moderate 
Islamic organizations, which were founded by Hijaz alumni (Bruinessen, 2009). 
Because the intricacies of the development of the Jawi movement in the Hijaz had 
been known, in which Snouck Hurgrenje played a big role, and understood that socio-
economy was the main motive, that was why moderate Islamic movements that approach 
fundamentalism can flourish during the Government era of Dutch Indies (Burhanudin, 2015; 
Fogg, 2014). In addition, the leaders of modern Islamic organizations had contact with Dutch 
elementary schools (Iqbal, 1989).  
Schools were part of the Ethical Policy (Niel, 1984) of the Dutch East Indies which was 
implemented by the powerful Kingdom of the Netherlands due to a paradigm shift in a 
country treated the powerless society and community organizations. The paradigm shift in 
state policy changed from a hegemonic system as later discussed by Gramsci (Bates, 1975; 
Martin, 1997) to a system of prioritizing order with various approaches including 
accommodative as later discussed by Foucault (Foucault, 1982; Green, 2010). 
The soft-power or accommodative political system applied in the Dutch East Indies to 
moderate Islamic movements and organizations with fundamental views was for three 
reasons. First, the movement had socio-economic motives, not religious principles. In this 
case, the Dutch East Indies only reacted when their economic interests were disturbed, such 
as Padri War (Fenton, 2015). Second, because the Dutch East Indies had understood the 
movement and the Ideology of the Hijaz, so that it was able to overcome the aspirations of 
the modern movement led by Hijaz alumni (Burhanudin, 2015). If abstracted in a broader 
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Islamic condition, the Hijaz alumni movement in the Dutch East Indies was beneficial 
because it could ensure that the condition of Turkey, which Europe was trying to conquer, did 
not affect the emotions and anger of the Jawi people. Third, because the organizers of Islamic 
modernism were familiar or even received basic education from Dutch schools. This could 
make the Dutch East Indies confident that these modern Islamic movements would not 
jeopardize the long-term interests of the Government. And it was proven that what made the 
Dutch East Indies collapse was not because of the modern movements, but Japan did. 
 
Masyumi as the Unification of Islamic Organizations in the Japanese Occupation 
 
In the final period of the Dutch East Indies Government, three models of Islamic 
thought had been formed in Indonesia, namely modernist which represented names such as 
Agus Salim, A. Hassan, Mohammad Natsir, Kartosowirdjo and Daud Beureueh. On the 
traditionalist side there were Hasyim Asy'ari, Teungku Hasan Krung Kale in Aceh and 
secularists such as Soekarno, Soepomo and Hatta (Latif, 2014; Suhelmi, 2007). The 
traditionalists played little role in the late Dutch East Indies period. The dispute occurred 
between modernists and secularists. The dispute culminated in a debate between A. Hassan 
and Soekarno (Soekarno, 1964).  
Yudi Latif (Latif, 2014) showed an interesting way to differentiate Muslim modernists 
from secularists. Modernists wanted a State based on Islam. Meanwhile, secularists wanted 
the State based on shared values. However, not all modernists wanted Islam as the basis of 
the State. Some of them also wanted a state based on shared values, but they wanted Islamic 
values to dominate. This desire for domination made the modernist relationship with the State 
not always get along (Noer, 1996).  
The dispute between the modernist group and the Dutch East Indies had occurred due 
to policies regulating marriage in conventional legal institutions (Noer, 1996). The presence 
of Japan made an appreciation of the aspirations of moderate Islam by establishing the KUA 
(Office of Religious Affairs) to handle the registration of religious laws such as marriage and 
so forth. Hizbullah and PETA (Patriot Movement) which will later strengthen the TNI 
(Indonesian National Army) were also Japanese appreciation. Moreover, the establishment of 
Masyumi as an organization that not only intends to unite modern Islamic organizations but 
also traditional Islam (Noor, 2016). 
Modernist Islam was eagerly awaiting Japan's presence because they hoped to replace 
the secular group which was highly appreciated by the Dutch. Modernist hopep of gaining an 
important position were met. But it was still localized. Because they had more competence, 
secular groups continue to dominate important positions in the Japanese government. In 
Aceh, the Cumbok war exploded due to the jealousy of PUSA (the association of muslim 
scholars throughout Aceh) modernists towards Uleebalangs (Kamila, 2017).  
 Japan had the interests of the Muslim ummah. Japan hoped that the Islamic 
community can make a military contribution to help them in the Pacific War. At the same 
time Japan provided support for Muslim intellectual groups to form an independence 
preparation committee (Abdullah, 2018).  
 Instead of appreciating the modernist group too much, Japan was more hopeful of the 
traditional group (Nasution et al., 2019). They saw the great potential for recruiting troops in 
the traditional circles. But it turned out that traditionalists did not like Japan. They fought a 
lot against Japan. Some physical contact took place in East Java which is a traditional base. In 
Aceh, a major war broke out between Japan and a Dayah (Islamic Boarding Schools) group 
in Cot Pling Bayu, North Aceh (Said, n.d.). Traditionalist rejection of Japan mainly occurred 
because they considered Japan to be adherents of the sun worshiping teachings (Miller et al., 
2002; Shigehiro, 2014).  
Although in some ways Japan had been repressive as a result of placing too much 
hope on the Indonesian people, Azyumardi Azra (Azra, 2005, 2014a) noted several roles of 
Japan for the Muslim community, including the establishment of the Office of Religious 
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Affairs (KUA). This institution resolved the anger of the Muslim community over the policy 
of the Dutch East Indies Government which made religious matters handled by conventional 
legal institutions (Kersten, 2017). This institution then became the embryo of the Ministry of 
Religion which handled a lot of matters. Another equally important contribution was the 
establishment of Masyumi as a result of the unification of various religious organizations 
which later played an important role in New Order politics and its influence can still be seen 
today. 
 
Old Order Handled Masyumi and Radicalism 
 
The Old Order was a period when Indonesia was involved in many problems so that it 
was unable to construct a stable government system. There were many radical Islamic 
movements taking place in Indonesia and they had no direct connection with global terrorism 
except for the modernist Muslim rebellion movement which was an alumni of the Hijaz so 
that the rebellions occurred rooted in a literalistic view of the status of a country (Latif, 
2014). 
There was no absolute agreement between secular groups and conservative 
modernists. The Jakarta Piagam which contains the obligations of the Islamic community to 
carry out Islamic law as the basis of the state was the hope of Indonesia as an Islamic state by 
modernists. But Soekarno canceled that article and replaced it with the Pancasila (The Five 
Principles) which is known today (Kersten, 2017).  
At the beginning of independence, although two secular intelligentsia, Soekarno and 
Hatta, were at the peak of power, modernist forces were very strong in Masjumi's 
representation. However, Masyumi's planned to make Indonesia an Islamic state was delayed 
due to the state's condition that had to fight against the Dutch and the communist coup plan. 
In terms of fighting the Dutch Military Session, all groups were united (Latif, 2015).  
The presence of Darul Islam (DI - Islamic Organization)/Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII 
- Indonesian Muslim Army) as a result of Kartosoewirdjo's actions left the Netherlands and 
Indonesia with no other way but to respond with an armed movement (Kersten, 2015). But 
the war between DI/TII and the TNI made the Dutch happy. Then Natsir and A. Hassan tried 
a negotiation approach but failed. Kartosoewirdjo's rebellion showed that modernists did 
adhere to fundamental religious beliefs. Likewise, the modern movement in Aceh which was 
united in the PUSA Aceh participated in the DI/TII rebellion in Aceh (Burhanudin, 2014). 
Kartosoewirdjo was the same as other modernists like Natsir who wanted Islam to be 
the basis of the state. But the way they go is different. Kartosoewirdjo chose an extreme path, 
he fought for his movement by means of terror (Carool Kersten, 2015). Meanwhile Natsir 
also had the same desire but chose a different way. Natsir wanted Kartosoewirdjo to fight for 
Islam again through parliament. But failed in the end, the repressive way was again chosen to 
beat DI/TII. 
Kartosoewirjo had many followers. Apart from Daud Beureueh in Aceh, he was also 
supported by Kahar Muzakkar in Sulawesi. In Kalimantan supported by Kiai Ibu Hajar. 
Kartosoewirjo and other DI movements were successfully crippled by the Indonesian 
government because this movement was not only opposed by government authorities, namely 
Soekarno and his secular groups, but also by his modernist colleagues (Ausop, 2009).  
 But his modernist colleagues who took the parliamentary route were not much 
different from Kartosoewirdjo's fate. Natsir's ambition to control the cabinet and his political 
maneuvers was not only opposed by the traditionalist group within Masyumi, namely 
representatives of the NU, but also other modernists. The departure of the NU from Masyumi 
showed that traditionalists can never get along with modernists (Bruinessen, 2009). Unlike 
modernists, traditionalists really had no intention of establishing an Islamic State. This 
traditionalist attitude showed their deep educational background and totality in studying 
religion. This was different from modernist groups who had ambitions to establish an Islamic 
State (Hefner, 2001).  
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 With Soekarno's point of view as the official government of Indonesia to measure the 
government's attitude towards Islamist groups, the point of view applied must position 
Soekarno flawlessly. Soekarno's political attitudes which were considered negative such as 
implementing Guided Democracy must be considered normal. What needs to be measured 
was how to deal with Islamists who were divided into radicals such as DI/TII and diplomatic 
ones like Masyumi (Mat Diah & Cholil, 2018). 
 
 
The government had put forward a diplomatic stance to handle the DI/TII. Natsir was 
sent by Hatta to persuade Kartosoewiryo to go down the mountain but failed. Since this 
movement was subversive, threatens sovereignty and an act of terrorism, it was natural for 
the government to handle it by military means. Finally Kartosoewiryo was arrested and 
executed. Meanwhile in Aceh, Beureueh was persuaded to go down the mountain (Iqbal & 
Rizal, 2012).  
 Despite his subversive actions, Beureueh was only placed under house arrest. His 
case was different from Kartosoewirdjo's who refused to go down the mountain and had to be 
arrested and executed. Beureueh was persuaded by Hasjmy. The government had even 
provided a lot of compensation to Acehnese Islamists by establishing the Darussalam Student 
Complex (Kopelma), establishing the Ulama Consultative Assembly (MPU), the Regional 
Education Council (MPD), the Aceh Baitulmal Agency (BMA) as a form of regional 
privileges given to Aceh and institutions Aceh Customs and Culture which later transformed 
into the Aceh Traditional Council (Iqbal & Rizal, 2012).  
 Meanwhile, Masyumi, who had seriously threatened the Republic of Indonesia, split 
him up and disbanded at the last leadership in the hands of Prawoto Mangkusasmito (Karim, 
2019). Former Masjumi officials were forced to self-isolate. The Al-Azhar Mosque had 
become an escape for former Masjumi members in Jakarta. The mosque was led by Hamka 
(Steenbrink, 2014). Hasjmy and the author of Tafsir Al-Azhar had many similarities with A. 
Hasjmy. Apart from being equally productive in writing religious and literary books, both of 
them were also arrested for being accused of being involved in radical movements and 
terrorism (Yakub, 2013). They both seem to share the same level of Islamism. Both were at 
the same radical-nationalism boundary (Yakub, 2013).  
 Although Hamka and Hasjmy did not involve in radical and extreme movements, 
they quoted Azra's term, the distance was only by hair ends. Natsir who wanted to Islamize 
the State (Nurdin, 2016). Meanwhile, the radical movements of Natsir's idea were 
Kartosoewirdjo, Kahar Muzakkar and Daud Beureueh (Ausop, 2009). For this reason, figures 
like Hasjmy and Hamka should be watched out for, but people like them should not be 
accused of subversive acts (Yakub, 2013). In this case, the focus of government action should 
be on modernist figures who did not commit acts of subversion such as Natsir, Hamka and 
Hasjmy. If Hasjmy and Hamka had the same opportunity as Natsir, of course they would act 
like Natsir's actions. But actions like Kartosoewirdjo need not be considered because DI/TII 
is subversion and must be stopped (Hasbi, 2014). Did the government exercise soft power to 
handle Natsir? Could the soft power used if Natsir was arrested. This was natural because the 
government, as described by Foucault, has the function of disciplining to achieve stability 
(Foucault, 1982; O’Neill, 1986). Meanwhile, Natsir's actions included subversion (Kersten, 
2015). But why was the government being tough on Hamka? Was this statement 
understandable: Because the government did not want Masjumi's existence to return. 
Meanwhile, many former Masjumi members took refuge in Hamka.  
The arrest of several modernist groups made the value of implementing the New 
Order's accommodative politics weak. But overall, the high appreciation for Hasjmy and 
modernists in Aceh until they mastered the narrative towards the formalization of Islamic law 
(Salim, 2015) by modernist groups, especially from IAIN Ar-Raniry, is also worth 
considering. Even nationally, the strengthening of the role of the Ministry of Religion and the 
spread of IAIN throughout Indonesia was an accommodative form of the government towards 
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modernists. The attitude of accommodation and providing space for expression within certain 
limits was very important so as not to give rise to radical movements and terrorism. However, 
the modernist movement in any form always had the opportunity for the emergence of 
fundamentalist ideas which were potential for radicalism. Radicalism was a fire in the husk to 
create terrorism (Garadian, 2018). And the New Order government was very clever at letting 
the fire in the husks not burn. 
 
New Order as a Heaven for Radicalism 
 
The anti-Western economic policies implemented by Soekarno made the Indonesian 
economy chaotic. He tried to approach the Eastern Bloc but was immediately suspected of 
being pro-communist. Finally the TNI AD (Indonesian National Army) staged a coup. 
Suharto was sent to leadership (Burhanudin & van Dijk, 2013). 
Initially Suharto's presence was considered by former Masjumi as a momentum to 
revive Masyumi. But it was very difficult. The former Masjumi had traumatized Suharto. 
Their past actions could really pose a threat. As a military that was not close to Islamist 
groups, Suharto did not need them at all. This indifferent attitude turned out to benefit former 
Masyumi members (van Bruinessen, 2002). 
Initially the traditional groups were close to Suharto. The main reason was because 
Ansor, as the wing of NU, had a big role in crushing PKI (Indonesian Comunist Party). The 
PKI ghost has indeed become an exaggerated issue and had made many innocent people 
become victims. At that time, if you were not happy with someone, it was enough to spread 
the issue that he was PKI and someone would cut his neck. Likewise, sometimes there were 
people who walked together with their friends to a quiet place; one person killed the other 
because they did not like it, they were resentful or because they were rumoured to be PKI. 
The next day his body would be believed to be the corpse of the PKI. That was Suharto’s 
action because he wanted to wipe out the PKI (Wieringa, 2003).  
Former Masjumi officials were not given room for practical politics. Natsir was given 
permission to establish DDII (Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council). This Institution was used 
for education and preaching (Raihan, 2016). On the other hand, Natsir used this institution to 
make contact with various international Islamic gangs, including those that carried out 
terrorist regeneration. The most famous terrorist who emerged through the Natsir network 
was Abu Bakar Baasyir (Carool Kersten, 2015, p. 28). Natsir continued to build relationships 
with his fellow radicals abroad such as high-ranking Muslim Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, 
top leaders of the Islamic Jamaat in Pakistan and other international radical Islamic 
movements (Mukherjee, 2010). 
Abu Bakar Baasyir founded Ponduk Ngruki in Sukoharjo as a Pesantren (Islamic 
Boarding School) that taught religious fundamentalism. Natsir also recruited other figures 
such as Imaduddin Abdurrahman to spread radical views on campus. The thoughts of his 
cadres and the network of movements built by Natsir were sufficient to describe who Natsir 
was and what Islamists were actually like (Fogg, 2013).  
The DDII organization kept in touch with fundamentalist organizations, radicalists, 
terrorists, international jihadists. During the New Order era, Christianization plagued various 
corners of Indonesia. As a da'wah organization, the DDII felt that it had a big burden to stop 
the movement (Hefner, 2001). At the same time, the DDII consistently spreads radical views. 
The government took no action. Pondok Ngruki, which is a forum for fundamentalist 
regeneration, was also safe. 
In this case, it can be seen how the Suharto government, even though it had a very bad 
experience with Islamists, it still did not make them act repressively. Even though Natsir's 
actions had led to criminals. It was clear that Natsir and the DDII opened up relations with 
international terrorist organizations and carried out terrorist regeneration in Indonesia. But the 
government did not act on him. 
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Opinions that consider Suharto as repressive towards Islamist groups of Islam were 
exactly the ghosts of the PKI. Facts contradicted to reality. Suharto did not need an Islamist 
group. Military strength was enough to make him sturdy. So all activities of Islamism were 
left alone. Regarding his proximity to traditionalist groups, at the beginning of his reign, it 
was neither beneficial nor detrimental to Suharto. This reason also seems to make Suharto did 
not care about the terrorist movements played by modernists. Instead of acting repressively, 
the New Order can be said to be the sowing period of fundamentalism and radicalism in 
Indonesia. But his acts of terror could not erupt because of the government's intelligence and 
military strength (Hefner, 2001). The actualization of the State concept described by 
Foucault, which sees the state as a disciplinary institution (Foucault, 1982; Green, 2010) 
only, had an orderly effect on the surface. But radical movements flourished underground. 
The Iranian revolution also greatly helped the growth of the tarbiyah fundamentalist 
movement. The New Order took advantage of the existence of this movement to stem the 
outbreak of the spirit of the Iranian revolution. By raising the stigma of Syi'ah as a 
revolutionary actor, the strategy was to continually campaign that Syi'ah was heretical 
teaching (Nasution & Miswari, 2017). The main actors of the deviant Syi'ah campaign were 
of course the DDII and the other radical tarbiyah movements (Ramakrishna, 2009). 
 In this case, Suharto also benefited from the existence of this radical Islamic 
movement. Suharto's claimed to act as emphatically against Islamist groups by implementing 
the Sole Principle of Pancasila for all mass and community organizations was only an 
implication of the Pancasila radicalization program policy in the government's Guidelines for 
the Living and Practicing of Pancasila (P4) (Lestari & Ruhadi, 2017). Even radical teachings 
that had become a serious problem on campuses were only handled by normalizing campus 
life which was also an inseparable program with P4. 
Instead of being said to be repressive, even during the New Order era, various forms 
of thinking in Islam developed. Nurcholish Madjid (Cak Nur) and Ahmad Wahib started 
secular Islamic thought with the principle of political desacralization (Nurcholish Madjid, 
2019). Ahmad Wahib wanted Islam not to be crushed by the times because it followed the 
rules of Islamic law that were no longer relevant to its era (Wahib, 1981). Cak Nur wanted to 
make him aware that Islam as a religion is sacred in nature. Meanwhile, politics and other 
pragmatic activities were profane. The two must not be mixed. Because if the sacred was 
involved in the profane, then the sacred would be practiced. On the other hand, if the profane 
was involved in the sacred, the profane would be sacred. These two segments had a 
foundation (ontology), approach (epistemology) and orientation (axiology). Because they 
were different, they must be treated differently according to their respective segments 
(Madjid, 2008). 
Cak Nur was accused of heresy by Islamist groups such as Rasjidi and Natsir. 
However, he was supported by Harun Nasution and Mukti Ali (Munhanif, 2014). In this case, 
it can be mapped which are secular modernists and which are fundamental modernists. The 
influence of Cak Nur made HMI MPO (Islamic Students Association) an organization 
separate from the principles of other Masyumi children's organizations, namely GPII and PII 
(Hefner, 2001). But Cak Nur, who infiltrated the ideas of secularism, liberalism and pluralism 
into the HMI MPO, admitted that his idea was an ideal representation of the Masjumi spirit as 
he carried out in Paramadina (Gaus, 2010; Madjid, 2019). 
During the New Order era, the role of the IAIN (State Institute of Islamic Studies) 
was very significant. Many IAIN alumni were sent to the West and Middle East to study. The 
result was the emergence of dynamic renewal ideas such as Cak Nur, Azumardi Azra, 
(Baharuddin, 2018) and Fachry Ali. The departure of the NU traditionalists from practical 
politics allowed traditional groups to focus more on education (Bruinessen, 2009). They also 
criticized the government policies. Slowly but surely, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) 
provided education for the Indonesian people to realize that we live in a modern nation. 
According to Gus Dur, Indonesians should be proud of their own cultural treasures, not easily 
fascinated by the appearance of religious thoughts and practices of other nations (Wahid, 
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2007). Since the mid-eighties, after breaking away from the influence of the generals, Suharto 
seemed to want to collect his services from Islamist groups. He began to join the modern 
group. The result was the establishment of the Indonesian Muslim Scholars Association 
(ICMI) (Ali, 1995). Dawam Rahardjo and Imaduddin Abdurrahman were among the 
intelligentsia who played an important role. In this case, Gus Dur refused to join. 
Gus Dur's refusal to join ICMI is a sign that ICMI was only to represent a moderate 
group that was close to fundamental principles. But public figures like Dawam Rahardo were 
confusing. Dawam and Kuntowijoyo, for example, were public figures in the middle between 
Imaduddin via a vis Cak Nur. Dawam and Kuntowijoyo had the PII (Indonesian Islamic 
Students) backgrounds. This modernist organization that was established during the Dutch 
military aggression was Masyumi's son who was treated by the DDII during the New Order 
era. These two figures wanted Islamic values to be infiltrated into the system. Such thoughts 
were also synonymous with Hasjmy. Again, to quote Azra's term, they were in a position of 
hair ends to become fundamentalists. 
In this case, it is important to distinguish modernists who wanted Islamic values to be 
infiltrated into an objective system. Hamka, Amien Rais, Hasjmy, Dawam Rahardjo and 
Kuntowijoyo had this pattern. Meanwhile Intelligence such as Soekarno, Cak Nur, Ahmad 
Wahib, Gus Dur, Ahmad Syafi'i Ma'arif, Azyumardi Azra and Budhy Munawar-Rachman 
could accept the values of religion and culture as long as they were good in objective space. 
The first group had the opportunity to act like Natsir to implement Islam as a system if they 
had the opportunity. The second group can be said to be the most reliable and expected 
intelligence to maintain the integrity of a pluralistic nation like Indonesia. 
Suharto hoped to approach the two Islamist groups after relations with the generals 
deteriorated. It turned out that Islamist groups opened up opportunities to approach Suharto. 
Closeness to Islamist groups could not improve Suharto's position. At the insistence of 
Islamists like Amin Rais, who controlled students who were already heavily influenced by 
the tarbiyah movement, and followed the advice of important figures such as Cak Nun, Gus 
Dur, Cak Nur and Megawati, Suharto resigned his post. 
The Islamism movement had become very widespread in Indonesia (Mujani & Liddle, 
2005). That was the end of Suharto, who was too close to Islamists. In fact, he had trusted 
Yusril Ihza Mahendra as his personal assistant. Later on, Yusril became the leader of the 
Bulan Bintang Party, Masjumi's ideological son. The New Order's lenient attitude towards 
Islamism made this period difficult to compare with the Dutch East Indies. However, due to 
excessive omission, the New Order can be said to be the softest against Islamists. The New 
Order exercised power most closely with what Foucault described as discipline (Foucault, 
1982). The level of accommodative politics in the New Order was followed by the Dutch 
East Indies, Japan and finally the Old Order. The final task of this article is to analyze the 
post-Reformation position among the gradations in the implementation of accommodative 




The fall of Suharto caused all the potential that emerged during the New Order to be 
actualized (van Bruinessen, 2002). The formalization of Islamic law in Aceh (Ansor & 
Muhammad, 2016; Salim, 2015) was the actuality of the potential for modernist imagination 
at IAIN Ar-Raniry which was given with the hope of reducing the potential for GAM (Free 
Aceh Movement) secular rebellion (Stange & Missbach, 2011) which was hidden throughout 
the New Order (Priyono AE, 2005). The map of Islamic thought has also experienced a shift 
(Bustamam-Ahmad, 2011). 
Various forms of terror had also occurred in Indonesia such as the Bali Bombing and 
the Sarinah Bombing and various other acts of terrorism (Batubara, 2018; Hughes, 2010). 
This terrorism, which was related to international terrorism networks, was built during the 
New Order. New phenomena emerged after Suharto (van Bruinessen, 2002). 
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Taliban terrorists born in Afghanistan who were born by the support of the United 
States of America's original goal to fight the Soviet Union. But after the Soviet Union 
collapsed, the Taliban transformed and attacked the United States. Osama bin Laden was a 
key figure in the movement (Azra, 2018; Pape & Feldman, 2013). He was a disappointed 
Saudi family businessman. Most of religious movements always originated from economic 
problems (Caroll Kersten, 2017).  
The Taliban had good relations with terrorism networks in Indonesia. Even in 
Menteng Raya 58 there was an Afghan alumni association. Their existence was very open. 
This network was knitted by Natsir and the DDII (Raihan, 2016) during the New Order era 
and was left behind by Suharto. The Southeast Asian Jamaah Ismamiyah terrorism network 
was also strong in Indonesia. The Bali bombing occurred as a result of the act of terrorists 
who had links with the terrorism movement in Afghanistan and Jemaah Islamiah.  
Gus Dur and Megawati seemed powerless to deal with the problem of terrorism in the 
early post-Reformation period. The PBB (Star Moon Party) and PKS (Social Justice Party) 
were considered unable to represent the aspirations of the Islamist group. As a result, radical 
groups like FPI (Islamic Defenders Front) emerged and took disturbing actions. The various 
riots caused by the FPI did not make Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) dismiss them 
(Fuller, 2011; Sukayat, 2018). 
In fact, the FPI had no direct relationship with terrorism in Bali and other acts of 
terror in Indonesia (Hughes, 2010). FPI had no network with international terrorist groups. 
But their actions were seen as unsettling. If the HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) had a 
relationship with the Natsir network, then FPI was really just an organization driven by the 
Habbaib association. Their masses were large because Habbaib had many Islamic boarding 
schools and recitation congregations (Rubaidi, 2014).  
Meanwhile, Joko Widodo (Jokowi), whose leadership was blasphemed by the FPI, did 
not really respond to this action. A soft attitude was still prioritized. Many mass actions held 
by the FPI had never been banned by the government. 
Before the government, fundamental organizations such as the FPI and HTI had a 
very regular attitude. Under SBY's leadership, the HTI which looked orderly managed to hold 
many large activities. That was what makes the HTI able to carry out a regeneration 
movement that reached to campuses and schools. However, because it was considered to 
contain principles that were against national sovereignty as a result of fighting for the 
caliphate system, the HTI was dismissed by Jokowi. 
Although it was not directly related, the HTI and FPI events were attended by 
overlapping masses. They got sympathy and support from urban people who did not have 
many opportunities to study religion seriously. The symbolic movement carried out by the 
FPI made many Muslims enthusiastic in attending the events. This system was also carried 
out by IAIN in Aceh in influencing traditional Muslim communities to be fascinated by the 
formalization of Islamic law. The FPI's symbolic gears were actually easily realized by 
traditionalists who had studied religion systematically in traditional Pesantren (Islamic 
Boarding School). That was why the FPI and HTI were strongly opposed by Ansor, who in 
fact were students of traditional Islamic boarding schools (Harris, 1976; Rubaidi, 2014). 
While the FPI members generally only learned religion through short recitations and the 
internet (Ahyar, 2017). 
The polite attitude of SBY and Jokowi made the post-Reformation impression as a 
regime that can also be said to be soft-power. Moreover, SBY was too permissive. However, 
Jokowi's omissions even though he was often a target personally should be taken into 
account. President SBY succeeded in stifling moderate movements by tightening formal 
education. This step was polite but deadly, in contrast to what Suharto did, who applied 
omission under control. These considerations made the New Order more permissive than the 
post-Reformation. The policing system as stated by Foucault (O’Neill, 1986) was carried out 
well by SBY through the conditionalization of formal education and Jokowi by dissolving the 
HTI constitutionally. The regulations made by SBY made him the ruler which made the 
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radical groups very depressed. Jokowi's attitude in dissolving the HTI also made Post-Reform 
credit no better than the Japanese occupation. SBY made room for groups, say neo-
traditionalists, or secular groups according to the term Islamism groups get a big stage. 
SBY's policy was not only to reduce opportunities for regeneration of radical groups, 
but also to suppress progressive groups. Especially with the issuance of a fatwa (a strong 
statement) from the MUI (Indonesian Council of Muslim Scholars) that decided to prohibit 
secularism, pluralism and liberalism (Munhanif, 2014). The fatwa had a huge effect in 
paralyzing the spirit of progressive Islamic thought (Miswari, 2019). The impact of SBY and 
Jokowi's policies has yet to be seen. But their systematization certainly made the Post-
Reformation period under the system of accommodating Japanese Occupation policies so as 




Azrumardi Azra's statement that the government applied accommodative politics in 
Indonesia has occurred since the Dutch East Indies Government. This article has analyzed the 
struggle between the state and the Islamic movement with the government from the Dutch 
East Indies to the Post-Reformation. The results show, the level of accommodative politics 
applied between government regimes, especially against radical movements or "fire in the 
husks" (Saputra, 2018) in order from the softest (soft-power) to the least gentle is: New 
Order, Dutch East Indies, Japanese Occupation, Old Order and Post-Reformation. 
With the indicators of limiting freedom and the impact of government policies on the 
Islamic movement, the New Order was the most accommodating regime. This regime made 
the Islamic movement import many radical ideologies from the international jihadist 
movement so that after the Reformation, the spirit and movement of radicalism grew rapidly 
and was very free to carry out its actions. 
A major contribution of the Dutch Indies accommodative policy was the 
establishment of many Islamic movements. Establishing Islamic movements became very 
easy during this period. The impact was influential throughout the Dutch East Indies 
Government until the Post-Reformation. They only acted repressively against the chaos 
created by the Padri troops. The Japanese occupation did have an influence on the 
establishment of Masyumi and KUA, who afterwards took a big role in politics and 
government. But Japanese motives are very pragmatic. The act of dissolving Masjumi and 
getting rid of its former members by the Old Order was an act that paralyzed the Islamic 
movement in controlling the system which made them transform into another form. This 
made the level of implementation of the soft power of the government during that period 
weak. Post-Reformation actually shows as if the government is ignoring Islamic movements, 
but the restraint through system regulation, although less aware of it and less visible impact, 
it can paralyze those movements. 
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